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This paper explores the direct ef fect of an education expansion on the level 
of earnings inequality by carrying out microsimulations for most Latin 
American countries. We find that the direct ef fect of the increase in years 
of education in the region in the 1990s and 2000s was unequalizing; this 
result is expected to hold for future expansions if increases in education 
are not highly progressive. Both facts are closely linked to the convexity 
of returns to education in the labor market. On average, the estimated 
impact of the education expansion remains unequalizing when allowing 
for changes in returns to schooling, although the ef fect becomes smaller.
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1. Introduction
Increasing education is one of the main ingredients in a typical recipe 
for development with equity. An upgrading of the human capital of 
a population is expected to contribute to higher productivity and 
hence a generalized increase in well-being, and also reduce income 
inequality. However, the link between education and inequality may 
not be that straightforward. Given that there may be convexities 
in returns to education, even an equalizing increase in schooling 
may generate an unequalizing change in the distribution of labor 
incomes. Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (2005) have labeled this 
phenomenon “the paradox of progress,” a situation where educational 
expansion is associated with higher income inequality. In this paper 
we explore whether this is merely a theoretical possibility with little 
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relevance in practice or a widespread phenomenon across real-world 
developing economies. 
Towards that end, we perform microeconometric decompositions that 
isolate the direct ef fect of changes in the distribution of education 
on earnings inequality. In particular, we estimate the counterfactual 
distribution of individual earnings that would be generated in a given 
period t if the distribution of education took the observed values in t* and 
all other variables remained at their values in t. The dif ference between 
the real earnings distribution and the counterfactual one characterizes 
the direct impact of the change in the distribution of education on the 
earnings distribution. The methodology is applied to household survey 
microdata for the Latin American countries in the period 1990-2009, 
exploiting a dataset that includes homogeneous definitions for the 
education, labor and income variables used in the analysis. 
We find that the direct ef fect of the increase in education experienced 
by most countries in Latin America in the last two decades was 
unequalizing, a result that is closely linked to the convexity of returns 
to education. The paper includes simulations of alternative future 
changes in the distribution of education and concludes that even 
education reforms that lead to an equalizing increase in schooling 
may be associated with higher earnings inequality. 
The paper makes two main contributions. On the one hand, it adds 
to the literature on education and inequality by highlighting a link 
between these two variables that is usually neglected, and by providing 
empirical evidence on its practical relevance. On the other hand, the 
paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of 
changes in inequality in Latin America (López Calva and Lustig, 2010; 
Gasparini and Lustig, 2011; Cornia, 2011) by examining a channel 
whose potential relevance has been recognized, but for which only 
scattered evidence has been available. To that aim the paper uses a 
unique homogenous dataset comparable across years and countries 
that covers all Latin American economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Using a simple model, in 
Section 2 we briefly illustrate the links between education and earnings 
and discuss the possibility of the paradox of progress. In Section 3 we 
explain the methodology of the microeconometric decompositions and 
comment on the data used. Section 4 presents the results of applying 
the microsimulations to characterize changes in earnings inequality in 
Latin America during the last two decades, while Section 5 presents 
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projections of earnings inequality under alternative education upgrading 
scenarios. Section 6 extends the analysis from previous sections in 
order to allow for changes in returns to education. Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
2. the theoretical link 
The most frequent general policy advice for a developing country is 
to increase the educational level of its population. Without much 
discussion, a reduction in inequality is often included in the list of the 
several positive consequences of an educational expansion.1 However, 
if returns to education are convex, an increase in schooling in the 
population may lead to higher earnings inequality even when the 
upgrade is moderately biased toward less-educated groups. Bourguignon 
et al. (2005) have dubbed this phenomenon “the paradox of progress,” 
a situation where an education expansion is accompanied by a surge 
in earnings inequality. 
This argument refers to the first-round, partial-equilibrium impact 
of the increase in education on inequality, and in particular assumes 
no change in returns to skills. Naturally, an education expansion, by 
shifting the supply of skilled labor, may reduce the wage premium and 
contribute to a reduction in earnings inequality. Assessing the overall, 
long-run general equilibrium impact of an increase in schooling on 
income distribution is certainly a very challenging task, one we cannot 
fully address in this paper. For this reason, we tackle the issue in two 
steps. First, we estimate the size of the initial direct impact of an 
education expansion, assuming no changes in returns to schooling, in 
order to illustrate the potential for the paradox. Second, we estimate 
changes in returns to education following the methodology proposed 
by Katz and Murphy (1992), which although it falls short of a full 
general equilibrium model, provides good approximations of the relevant 
parameters and has been extensively used in the literature (Card and 
Lemieux, 2001; Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth, 2012). Using 
these estimates we perform a robustness exercise to determine if the 
paradox still holds under changing returns. 
We start in this section by illustrating the possibility of an inequality-
increasing expansion of education with a simple model. Consider first 
1. The link between education and inequality has been addressed by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), 
Krueger and Lindhal (2001), Soto (2002) and Pritchett (2001), among others. 
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that the logarithm of individual earnings Yi is related to the individual 
level of education Xi in a linear way. Ignoring other determinants for 
simplicity’s sake, this relationship at period t can be expressed as
lnYit = αt + βtXit + εit (1)
where unobservable determinants are summarized in the zero-mean 
term εi. Under the assumption of independence between Xi and εi 
parameter β is interpreted as a measure of returns to education.2 
Assume that the whole set of income earners can be divided into two 
groups H and L, with XH > XL, and E(lnYH) > E(lnYL). A simple 
measure of earnings inequality in this two-group society is the expected 
proportional earnings gap G. Taking conditional expectation and 
rearranging,
G ≡ E(lnYHt − lnYLt) = βt (XHt − XLt) (2)
From Equation (2) the change in earnings inequality between periods 
1 and 2 can be expressed as
ΔG ≡ E(lnYH2 − lnYL2) − E(lnYH1 − lnYL1)
  = (β2 − β1)(XH1 − XL1) + β2(dXH − dXL)
(3)
where dXi is the change in the level of education for earners in group 
i = H,L. Equation (3) implies that the change in inequality depends 
on changes in returns to education over time (β2 − β1), the initial 
dif ference in educational levels (XH1 − XL1), and the relative change 
in education (dXH − dXL). If returns to education do not vary over 
2. In order to keep the notation uncluttered, we assume independence between education and the un-
observable component. It is straightforward to allow for other assumptions like mean independence but 
the main conclusions remain unchanged.
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time and the growth in educational levels is similar across groups, 
earnings inequality remains unchanged. 
These results are modified when we allow the model to include convex 
returns to education. Assume that the logarithm of earnings and 
education are related through a quadratic function:
lnYit = αt + βtXit + γtXit2 + εit (4)
In such a case, the expected change in the proportional gap of earnings 
between H and L takes the form:
ΔG = (β2 − β1)(XH1 − XL1) + β2(dXH − dXL)
  + (γ2 − γ1)(XH12  − XL12 ) + γ2(dXH2 − dXL2)
  + 2γ2 (XH1dXH − XL1dXL)
(5)
Notice that when returns to education remain unchanged and 
changes in education across groups are similar, Equation (5) becomes 
ΔG = 2γ2(XH1 − XL1)dX, which is positive under convex returns to 
education: inequality rises in response to an equal increase in education 
across the population. From (5), if returns to education do not change 
and returns are convex, even an unbalanced increase in education in 
favor of the unskilled group L may lead to a surge in earnings inequality. 
To see this, assume dXL = λdXH with λ > 1. Earnings inequality G 
increases in this case if
λ λ
β
γ
λ− > − + −X X dX1
2
( 1)( ( 1) )H L H1 1
2
2
(6)
which is more likely to occur with highly convex returns to education. 
Similarly, if the convexity is suf ficiently high, earnings inequality may 
increase even after an education expansion that reduces returns to skills.3 
3. Alejo (2012) explores another possibility for an increase in earnings inequality that arises due to the 
greater variability of earnings at higher educational levels.
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3. empirical strategy
This section presents an empirical strategy to provide evidence on 
the direct impact of changes in education on earnings inequality. The 
methodology follows Gasparini, Marchionni, and Sosa Escudero (2005), 
which in turn is based on Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig (2005). 
It requires the estimation of earnings equations at the individual level 
and the use of the resulting coef ficients to construct counterfactual 
distributions. Earnings are modeled as parametric functions of observable 
characteristics, and the residuals of the regressions are interpreted 
as the ef fect of unobservable factors. In this section we describe the 
methodology that we follow to estimate the counterfactual distribution 
of individual earnings that would be generated in a given period t (or 
country p) if the distribution of education took the observed values in 
t* (or p*) and the rest of the earning’s determinants remained at their 
values in t (or p). The dif ference between the real distribution and the 
counterfactual one characterizes the direct first-round distributional 
impact of the change in the distribution of education. 
3.1. empirical model
Following Gasparini et al. (2005), we represent the individual earnings-
generating process at time t as
lnYit = F(Xit,Zit,εit,βXt,βZt) (7)
where Yit are individual earnings, Xit is the vector of individual observable 
characteristics related to education, Zit is the vector of observable non-
educational characteristics, εit is the vector of individual unobservable 
characteristics, and βXt and βZt are the vectors of parameters that 
link Xit and Zit with Yit. 
The distribution of individual earnings is a vector 
Dt ≡ {Y1t,…,YNt} (8)
where N is the number of workers in the economy. Our 
microsimulation strategy consists of estimating the counterfactual 
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income distribution that would arise if the educational structure were 
dif ferent from the actual structure. In particular, we perform three 
types of exercises: (i) simulate the counterfactual earnings on year t 
assuming an educational structure similar to that observed in year 
t*; (ii) simulate the counterfactual earnings of a country p assuming 
an educational structure similar to that observed in country p*; and 
(iii) simulate the counterfactual earnings that would arise under 
dif ferent education upgrading scenarios (e.g., an increase of one year 
of education for each worker in the population). 
The counterfactual log income for individual i in year t if X* instead 
of X were observed can be defined as
lnYit(Xit*) = F(Xit*,Zit,εit,βXt,βZt) (9)
Notice that we are measuring only the direct impact of a change in 
X, and then in (9) we keep all other factors in the income-generating 
function fixed. The counterfactual earnings distribution is then
Dt(X *) = {Y1t(Xit*),…,YNt(XNt* )} (10)
Therefore, if we measure inequality by means of an index I [D ], the 
direct impact of the change in the educational structure X on earnings 
inequality is
I [Dt(X *)] − I [Dt ] (11)
3.2. estimation strategy
In order to calculate (11), we need to obtain estimations of the vectors 
of parameters βXt and βZt and the vector of unobservable characteristics 
εit. Moreover, given that no panel data is available for our purpose, 
we need a device to replicate the educational structure of one year (or 
country) into the population of another year (or country).
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The estimations of βXt, βZt and εit are obtained from standard Mincer equations (Mincer, 1974), in which we model the logarithm 
of individual monthly earnings as a linear function of observable 
individual characteristics:
lnYit = αt + XitβXt + ZitβZt + εit (12)
Education-related characteristics Xit are alternatively measured by a 
set of dummies for the highest educational level completed and by the 
number of years of formal education and its square, while observable 
non-educational characteristics Zit include age, age squared, a gender 
dummy, a dummy for youths less than 18 years old, regional dummies, 
and an urban/rural dummy. There are well-known limitations derived 
from the econometric specification of this model. In particular, it is 
dif ficult to identify returns to education from returns to unobservable 
skills given that they are potentially correlated.4 Data limitations do 
not allow us to instrument educational variables (Angrist and Krueger, 
1991) in order to obtain consistent estimations of returns to education. 
In order to replicate the educational structure of year t* (or country 
p*) into the population of year t (or country p), we use two alternative 
methods. The first is adapted from Gasparini et al. (2005) who propose 
dividing the adult population into homogeneous age-gender groups 
(cells) and then replicating the levels of education of a certain cell in 
year t* into the corresponding cell of year t. The procedure requires 
the selection of individuals who “move” from one level of education 
to another until the desired structure is replicated. This selection 
process is random, but we impose the restriction that individuals 
move sequentially across levels. For example, assume that we need to 
replicate the “incomplete primary school” level of a particular cell in 
year t* into the population of year t and that this implies increasing 
the number of individuals with this level in t. We start by assigning 
to the counterfactual “incomplete primary school” level all the 
individuals in t with this level of education (and the corresponding 
4. If A is the unobserved ability correlated with earnings by the parameter ϕ and related to education 
by X = ρA + v, then OLS estimation of (4) results in the usual asymptotical ability bias (ϕρ) for βt. 
It is straightforward to show that if ability is symmetrically distributed, OLS consistently estimates γt 
in (4). Assuming that ability is time invariant, our simulated inequality change dif fers from the “true 
change” by the term ϕρ (dXH – dXL) (see Equation (5)). According to Card (1999) in most empirical 
applications IV estimations of βt are higher than OLS (implying a negative ϕρ or measurement error); 
therefore, our simulations would be a lower bound for the simulated change when ability is observed.
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age). Subsequently, since more people are needed in this level-age cell 
in order to achieve the counterfactual size, those individuals who have 
completed primary school would be chosen, followed by, those with 
incomplete secondary education, and so on until the share of people 
with “incomplete primary level” in this cell in year t* is reached. 
The second procedure closely follows Legovini, Bouillón, and Lustig 
(2005). The adult population of year t is also divided into homogeneous 
age-gender cells. For each individual i within cell j we perform the 
following transformation over the variable years of formal education: 
µ
σ
σ
µ= −






+X X( )ijt ijt jt
jt
jt
jt
*
*
* (13)
where µjt and σjt are the sample mean and standard deviation within 
cell j in year t, whereas µj*t and σj*t are the sample mean and standard 
deviation estimated for the corresponding cell j in year t*. For each cell in 
year t this adjustment results in a distribution of the years of education 
with mean and variance similar to the corresponding cell in year t*.
As emphasized above, the approach outlined provides estimations of the 
partial-equilibrium, first-round impact of a change in the distribution 
of education on earnings inequality. Of course, if educational levels 
are modified, other variables that are fixed in the analysis may 
change, such that the final ef fect of a shock in education may dif fer 
from the direct impact. For instance, as the population becomes 
more educated, the change in the relative supply of skilled workers 
modifies returns to education, which can in turn compensate for the 
first-order unequalizing impact.5 There are two main justifications for 
going ahead with the decompositions despite this important caveat: 
(i) estimating a full general equilibrium model that properly takes 
into account the movement of all the relevant variables is beyond the 
technical capabilities in many cases, and (ii) it is illustrative of the 
direction and magnitude of the direct impact of a change, which in 
many applications turns out to be the most important. In addition, 
while in the next two sections we estimate the direct impact of an 
education expansion, in Section 6 we estimate changes in returns to 
education and carry out a robustness analysis of the main results. 
5. See for example Katz and Murphy (1992) and Manacorda et al. (2010).
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3.3. dataset and methodological decisions
The main source of data for this paper is the Socio-Economic Database 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly developed 
by the Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS) 
at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata (Argentina) and the World 
Bank’s Latin America and the Caribbean Poverty and Gender Group 
(LCSPP). This database contains information on more than 300 
national household surveys in 25 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
countries. All variables in SEDLAC are constructed using consistent 
criteria across countries and years, and identical programming routines 
(see sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar). In this paper we use microdata for 18 
Latin American countries, covering the period 1990-2009.6
All calculations are performed using the subsample of workers aged 
14 to 65 and, following a standard procedure, we exclude from the 
inequality measurement and Mincer estimations those individuals who 
do not receive any payment for their work. We define the logarithm of 
monthly labor income as the dependent variable in Mincer equations. 
Given that the structural relationship between individual characteristics 
and earnings could be dif ferent for heads and other members of the 
household, we follow Gasparini et al. (2005) and separately estimate 
models for the head of household, the spouse, and other members. 
As we discussed in previous sections, a key factor in the relationship 
between education and inequality is the convexity of returns to 
education. Parametric assumptions about a particular functional 
form of these returns may modify the results. In our estimations we 
include education using two alternative definitions: (i) years of formal 
education and (ii) dummies for the highest educational level completed 
by each individual. The first definition, in which years of schooling 
is used as educational variable, allows us to obtain a parametric 
measure of the convexity of returns by means of the coef ficient of the 
squared variable. On the other hand, the dummies for educational 
levels allow for a more flexible estimation of the structure of returns to 
education. As described above, we use a dif ferent simulation method 
for each type of educational variable. Notice that results from both 
types of simulations can substantially dif fer because there is not a 
6. For comparison purposes, in each country we restrict the sample to the areas covered by the national 
household survey in the entire period of analysis. Therefore, in Argentina we restrict the sample to the 
15 cities covered in the 1992 survey, in Brazil we exclude rural-northern areas that have been included 
since 2004, and we only use urban areas from Uruguay since rural areas were only added in 2006. 
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direct correspondence between a change in years of education and a 
change in the share of workers with dif ferent levels of schooling. For 
instance, an increase in years of education could have little impact 
on the education structure if it is insuf ficient to move enough people 
to the subsequent level. We perform non-parametrical estimations to 
provide evidence on the convexity of returns and the validity of the 
quadratic specification.
4. results
In this section we present the results of the microsimulations in order 
to characterize changes in earnings inequality during the 1990s and 
2000s in 13 Latin American economies. In particular, we seek to 
evaluate how the education expansion in these countries af fected the 
earnings distribution. To do this, we start with a brief description of 
the changes in years of education during the period 1990-2009. 
4.1. Changes in education
All countries in Latin America experienced a substantial education 
expansion during the 1990s and 2000s (Figure 1). On average, the 
number of years of formal education for the working population grew 
by 1.5 years between 1990 and 2009, with a minimum of 0.7 in Panama, 
and a maximum of 2.9 in Brazil. 
This educational expansion was not homogeneous across population 
groups. To examine educational inequality we report three dif ferent 
measures. The educational Gini measures relative inequality in the 
distribution of years of schooling, independently of income, while the 
dif ference in the average years of education between the top and bottom 
quintiles of that distribution (Gap 1) measures absolute inequality in 
education, and the dif ference in mean years of education between the 
richest and poorest earnings quintiles (Gap 2) is a measure of absolute 
inequality in education relative to earnings.7 
7. Whether a change in years of education should be evaluated using a relative or absolute definition 
of inequality is a matter of subjective assessment. Nevertheless, for non-monetary variables like educa-
tion, it is sometimes more natural to evaluate changes in absolute rather than relative terms (Kolm, 
1977). In the case of years of schooling, an absolute inequality measure remains constant under identi-
cal additions of years of education to all individuals, whereas a relative indicator remains unchanged 
under proportional increments in this variable. If we multiply every individual’s years of education by a 
constant, the Gini coef ficient, which is a relative index, remains constant, whereas an absolute indicator, 
such as the educational gap, increases. 
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During the last two decades education inequality measured by 
a relative index (Gini of years of education) fell in all countries, 
whereas results are mixed when using absolute indicators such as 
the educational gaps. The dif ference in years of education between 
extreme education quintiles dropped in three countries, increased 
in two and remained relatively unchanged in the rest. Measured by 
the gap between earnings quintiles, education became more unequal 
in seven countries, whereas in the rest inequality fell slightly. 
The average educational Gini coef ficient in Latin America fell by 
5.7 points, whereas the gap between years of education quintiles 
remained unchanged and the educational gap between earnings 
quintiles rose by 0.3 years. 
figure 1. Changes in years of education and educational 
inequality, 1990-2009
Working population [14, 65]
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
Note: LA = mean for Latin America. Gap 1: dif ference in mean years of education between quintiles 5 
and 1 of the distribution of years of education. Gap 2: dif ference in mean years of education between 
quintiles 5 and 1 of the distribution of earnings. 
13D. Battistón, C. García-Domench, and L. Gasparini | Education and Inequality in Latin America
Changes in the measures dif fered greatly in the two decades under 
analysis. While the mean educational Gini dropped substantially in 
both periods, the average educational gaps increased between 1990 
and 2002, but decreased between 2002 and 2009 (Figure 2). These 
results suggest that the education growth path was biased toward 
more educated (or wealthier) groups between 1990 and 2002, and 
slightly biased toward less educated (or poorer) groups between 2002 
and 2009. This break in educational gaps can entail dissimilar ef fects 
on earnings inequality during each sub-period, as we will discuss 
later in this section.
4.2. results from the microsimulations
For each country/period, Table 1 reports the actual change in the Gini 
coef ficient of the earnings distribution, along with the counterfactual 
changes simulated by altering the educational structure. For Simulation 1 
we use education levels as the relevant educational variable, whereas 
in Simulation 2 we use years of formal education. Given that the 
results are path dependent, we alternatively simulate (i) the change in 
the Gini coef ficient if the education structure of the first year of the 
period is simulated on the last-year population, and (ii) the change 
in the Gini coef ficient if the education structure of the last year is 
figure 2. Changes in educational inequality
Mean for Latin American countries, 1990s and 2000s
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simulated on the first-year population. We report the average of the 
results obtained from each procedure.8
The interpretation of Table 1 is straightforward. For example, in the 
case of Brazil the Gini coef ficient for the earnings distribution increased 
0.7 points between 1992 and 2009. The first simulation reveals that 
the education expansion had a direct, first-round unequalizing impact 
on the earnings distribution of approximately 1 Gini point. If only the 
educational structure had changed between 1992 and 2009, the Gini 
coef ficient for the earnings distribution would have increased by 1 point. 
Under Simulation 1 the education expansion had an unequalizing 
impact on earnings in 11 countries, while it was equalizing only in 
Uruguay.9 As mentioned before, Simulation 2 uses years of education 
8. The estimated coef ficients of Mincer equations for each country are available upon request. 
9. Similarly, Bourguignon et al. (2005) find that in five of the seven countries studied (Argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, and Malaysia) the ef fect of educational expansions was to increase inequal-
ity. Other authors also report similar results for other countries (Langoni, 1973; Almeida dos Reis and 
Paes de Barros, 1991; Knight and Sabot, 1983; Reyes, 1988; Lam, 1999).
table 1. ef fect of change in education distribution  
on earnings inequality 
Country Period
observed Gini education effect (Δ Gini)
t1 t2 Change simulation 1 simulation 2
Argentina 1992-2009 39.4 40.1 0.7 0.2 *** 1.2 ***
Brazil 1992-2009 50.4 51.1 0.7 1.0 *** 1.6 ***
Chile 1990-2009 52.5 50.2 -2.3 0.6 *** 0.7 ***
Costa Rica 1990-2009 40.0 45.4 5.4 0.9 *** 3.2 ***
Ecuador 1994-2009 53.3 45.5 -7.8 0.4 *** 2.1 ***
El Salvador 1995-2008 45.6 44.6 -1.0 2.5 *** 1.5 ***
Honduras 1995-2009 52.4 52.0 -0.4 1.7 *** 1.0 ***
Mexico 1989-2008 48.1 49.3 1.2 0.6 *** 1.1 ***
Nicaragua 1993-2005 53.6 49.4 -4.2 0.9 *** 1.3 ***
Panama 1991-2009 47.0 47.4 0.4 0.2 *** 2.0 ***
Peru 1997-2009 50.4 50.5 0.1 -0.0  1.7 ***
Uruguay 1992-2009 44.9 47.7 2.8 -0.9 *** 0.5 ***
Venezuela 1992-2006 36.7 37.8 1.1 0.6 *** 0.7 ***
Average -0.2 0.7 1.4
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
Note: Simulation 1 follows Gasparini et al. (2005) to change the educational structure, while Simulation 2 
follows Legovini et al. (2005). Workers aged 14 to 65. Significance levels obtained using 200 bootstrap 
repetitions.
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instead of levels of schooling in order to measure changes in education. 
In this case, the estimated ef fects are always unequalizing. In addition, 
for most countries increases in inequality are more pronounced than 
those estimated under Simulation 1. 
Table 2 splits the results from Table 1 into two sub-periods: 1990-2002 
and 2002-2009. The outcomes from Simulation 1 indicate that during 
the 1990s changes in education in Latin American countries had, on 
average, a direct unequalizing impact on the earnings distribution of 
0.6 Gini points, whereas in the 2000s the average estimated increase 
was 0.2. Simulation 2 reveals a similar pattern: the average simulated 
increase in the earnings Gini was 1.3 between 1990 and 2002, and 
only 0.4 between 2002 and 2009. The dif ference in the magnitude of 
the unequalizing impacts of the educational expansions in the 1990s 
and 2000s is consistent with the dissimilar patterns in the educational 
gaps documented above. In the 1990s the combination of convex 
returns (as we will see below) and educational improvements biased 
toward the most educated (or wealthier) groups resulted in a larger 
unequalizing ef fect on the earnings distribution. In contrast, during 
the 2000s educational changes seemed to be slightly biased toward 
less educated (or poorer) groups, a fact that resulted in a smaller 
unequalizing ef fect on earnings. In fact, for some countries (Argentina, 
Chile, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay) the educational expansion had 
a direct equalizing impact on earnings. 
Convexity of returns to education
As discussed in Section 2, the way in which an education expansion 
af fects earnings inequality critically depends on the convexity of 
returns to education. Convexity has been widely documented for Latin 
American labor markets (e.g., Gasparini et al. (2005) for Argentina; 
Legovini, Bouillón, and Lustig (2005) for Mexico; and Blom, Holm-
Nielsen, and Verner (2001) for Brazil).10 11 In addition, there is 
literature that documents and discusses determinants of the increase 
in the degree of convexity of returns in Latin America, mainly in the 
10. For Chile, Rau (2013), uses a general modeling framework for nonparametric models with endog-
enous regressors and heterogeneity to estimate the returns to education. The author finds that the local 
average returns to schooling are highly nonlinear.
11. Using quantile regression estimates of the returns to schooling over a sample of male workers in 16 
developed countries during the mid-1990s, Martins and Pereira (2004) find that returns to education 
increase along the wage distribution. 
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1990s (Manacorda et al., 2010; Attanasio et al., 2004; Pavcnik et al., 
2005; Binelli, 2008; Gasparini et al., 2011). 
The convexification of returns to education has been previously discussed 
for dif ferent countries. Mincer (1998) and Deschênes (2002) highlight this 
phenomenon for the United States, and Lemieux (2006) also shows that 
wages have become a much more convex function of education in the 
mid-2000s compared to the mid-1970s. Mehta et al. (2013) find evidence 
that the expansion of the service sector drove the convexification of 
returns in India, the Philippines, and Thailand. Savanti and Patrinos 
(2005) show evidence for Argentina in the period 1992-2002. Other 
examples are Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003) and Binelli (2012) 
for Mexico, and Soderbom et al. (2003) for Kenya and Tanzania.
Dif ferent explanations have been proposed to account for the convexification 
of returns to education. As pointed out by Binelli (2012), most of them 
are demand-driven explanations, such as the Lemiux (2006) model with 
heterogeneous returns to schooling, or the task-based technical change 
model of Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) where new technologies have 
varying complementarity with skilled and unskilled labor.12 
In the context of LAC countries, there is an extensive literature linking 
the changes in returns to education with trade and market reforms 
(e.g., Attanasio et al., 2004; Pavcnik et al., 2005; Revenga, 1997; 
and Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003). In a more comprehensive study 
Behrman, Birdsall, and Székely (2006) analyze the ef fects of trade 
liberalization policies during the 1990s for 18 Latin American countries. 
They find that in most of these economies returns to higher education 
dramatically increased, whereas returns to secondary and primary school 
decreased. The authors discuss some potential mechanisms behind 
this convexification process. First, trade liberalization itself could 
have shifted demand toward industries intensive in natural resources 
or land, displacing the production of unskilled-intensive industries 
to China and other Asian economies (as implied by Spilimbergo et 
al., 1999). Trade liberalization could also have increased demand for 
intermediate goods that are intensive in skilled labor in developing 
countries (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001). Second, inflows of external 
capital, particularly investment in capital equipment, can be skilled-
biased due to a high complementarity between these factors. Third, 
financial sector liberalization could have benefited more large firms 
12. Binelli (2012) is among the few, if not the only, explanation relying on the supply side.
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that demand skilled labor with more intensity. Finally, other potential 
mechanisms behind this convexification process include tax reforms, 
labor market reforms, and privatizations. 
Figure 3 reports the estimated average coef ficients of the variable years 
of education squared over the period under analysis. That coef ficient is 
usually taken as a measure of the convexity of returns to education.13 
In all the countries in the sample that coef ficient is positive and 
significant: Convexity in returns to education is a common feature 
of Latin American labor markets. We come to the same conclusion 
using the alternative Mincer equation (with dummies for levels of 
education instead of years of schooling). This is a much more flexible 
specification and also captures the convexity of returns (see Figure 4).
Non-parametric estimations provide further evidence of the convexity of 
returns to education.14 The quadratic approximation is much closer to 
13. Given that we separately estimate Mincer equations for head of household, spouse, and other 
members of the household, we average the coef ficients of these regressions for all household members 
and all periods of analysis. The coef ficients are comparable since dependent variables in all Mincer 
equations are expressed in 2005 PPP dollars and independent variables are homogeneously constructed 
using SEDLAC definitions.
14. All the non-parametric estimations are available upon request. 
figure 3. Convexity of returns to education
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
CH
L
CR
I
PE
R
EC
U
SL
V
A
RG PA
N
BR
A
H
N
D
V
EN N
IC
M
EX U
RY
Co
nv
ex
ity
 o
f r
et
ur
ns
to
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from household surveys. 
Note: Mean of coef ficients of squared years of education in Mincer equations, over the period 1990-2009. 
All coef ficients are significant at 1% level. 
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the non-parametric estimation than the linear approximation. For low 
years of education, the non-parametric and quadratic approximation 
estimate flatter returns than the profile estimated under the linear 
specification. Also, in most cases the returns at the upper tail of the 
distribution are steeper for the non-parametric/quadratic specification 
than for the linear one. These facts support the convex-returns 
hypothesis and also make the quadratic specification a reasonable 
simplification assumption.
Convexity makes it harder for educational improvements to reduce 
earnings inequality, according on the theoretical model described in 
Section 2.15 Under convex returns, even an unbalanced increase in 
education in favor of the less educated (or poorer) groups may lead to 
a surge in earnings inequality. Moreover, the higher the convexity of 
15. The convexity condition in our model is defined as the “logarithmic convexity” of returns to educa-
tion. As noted by Bourguignon et al. (2005), if we proportionally increase the years of education of 
every worker, a stronger condition is required to keep inequality unchanged. In terms of our model, 
this condition can be denoted as a “strong convexity” of returns to education with respect to earnings 
(instead of log earnings). Our estimations suggest that in all countries, returns are strongly convex with 
respect to earnings, meaning that education inequality must drop by a significant amount in order to 
reduce earnings inequality. 
figure 4. returns to education (in levels)
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the returns, the larger the bias toward the more disadvantaged groups 
in the education expansion should be in order to reduce inequality in 
the distribution of earnings (Equation (6)). There is a clear, positive 
relationship between the convexity of returns to education and the 
counterfactual changes in earnings inequality, with Chile as the only 
outlier (Figure 5). The linear correlation coef ficient is 0.27 with Chile, 
and 0.79 without that observation (significant at 1%). This positive 
relationship suggests that the education expansion during the last two 
decades brought about a stronger unequalizing ef fect on the earnings 
distribution in those countries with higher convexity in returns to 
education. 
As expected from the model in Section 2 and the evidence on convexity, 
the simulated changes in earnings inequality associated with changes 
in years of education (Simulation 2) are positively correlated with the 
change in mean years of education (coef ficient equal to 0.29), and the 
change in education inequality, as measured alternatively by the Gini 
(0.32), educational gap 1 (0.41), and gap 2 (0.61). The initial gap in 
years of education is also positively correlated with the simulated change 
in earnings inequality (coef ficients of 0.45 for gap 1 and 0.44 for gap 2). 
figure 5. Convexity in returns to education and simulated 
changes in earnings inequality
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The theoretical model in Section 2 also shows that changes in returns 
to education af fect earnings inequality. In all countries except Panama, 
Argentina, and Uruguay, returns to education declined during the period 
1990-2009, implying an equalizing impact on the earnings distribution. 
The ef fect of the change in structural parameters on inequality is usually 
defined by the literature as the parameter or price ef fect (Bourguignon 
et al., 2005). Although its estimation is straightforward from the 
methodology described in Section 3, measuring and discussing this 
ef fect is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.3. Characterizing dif ferences across countries
Alternatively, the methodology described above could be applied to 
assess the extent to which dif ferences in the distribution of years of 
education across countries can account for the observed dif ferences in 
labor income inequality. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report, for each country, 
the counterfactual change in the Gini coef ficient for the earnings 
distribution simulated by replicating the educational structure of the 
country in a given column. For instance, if in Argentina we simulate 
an educational structure similar to that observed in Bolivia, the Gini 
coef ficient for the earnings distribution would be 2.7 points higher 
than the one that is actually observed. Conversely, inequality would 
be lower in Argentina if the educational structure were similar to that 
observed in Costa Rica, Panama, or Uruguay. Similarly to previous 
simulations, in Table 3 we use completed levels of education as the 
relevant educational variables, whereas in Table 4 we use years of 
formal education and its square. 
Two opposing patterns are evident in Tables 3 and 4. On the one 
hand, if the relatively more unequal educational structures of Bolivia 
or Peru were imposed on other economies, other things being equal, 
earnings inequality would rise. On the other hand, if the relatively less 
unequal educational structure of Costa Rica or Uruguay were imposed 
on other countries, earnings inequality would drop. For the rest of 
the countries, the results depend on the simulated structure and the 
definition of the education variable (years or levels).
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5. Projecting the future 
In the previous section we discussed how past educational changes 
influence levels of earnings inequality. It is also interesting to assess how 
future changes in education could af fect inequality. In this section we use 
microeconometric decompositions to simulate the impact of alternative 
education expansions on earnings inequality measures. The results again 
are estimates of the direct, first-round ef fect of the education expansion.
5.1. results from microsimulations
We simulate changes in earnings inequality driven by two counterfactual 
changes in education: an increase of one year of formal education for 
each worker in the sample (Simulation 3) and a proportional change 
that raises the average years of education by one year (Simulation 4). 
If we assume that returns to education remain constant, the ef fect 
of one year more of education for every worker (Simulation 3) is 
undoubtedly unequalizing in all countries (Table 5). Since the change 
in education is assumed to be balanced across less- and more-skilled 
groups, this example illustrates the outstanding role of the convexity 
of the returns to education. Unsurprisingly, a change in education 
biased toward more educated groups, like the proportional increase in 
years of education assumed in Simulation 4, raises earnings inequality 
in all countries even more than Simulation 3. 
Under both simulations the highest counterfactual increases in 
inequality occur in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, whereas the 
lowest changes occur in Guatemala, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In fact, 
there is high positive correlation between the simulated changes in 
earnings inequality and the estimated convexity of returns to education 
(Figure 6). The linear correlation coef ficient is 0.93. Once more, this 
shows that the higher the convexity of the returns to education, the 
greater the unequalizing ef fect of an education expansion.
5.2. Inequality-reducing education expansions 
The results of Simulations 3 and 4 are consistent with the theoretical 
model: A proportional increase in years of education or even a uniform 
increase for all workers would result in higher earnings inequality 
under convex returns. We now examine the conditions under which 
an increase in education would produce a decline in inequality. With 
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this aim, we define the following transformation that will be used 
to simulate an average increase of one year of education (X) under 
dif ferent educational growth paths:
θ θ= + −





 >
δ
X X
X
X
1 , 0i i
i
max
* (14)
Equation (14) defines the transformation as a function of two exogenous 
parameters δ and θ. Xmax is the highest value of the years of education 
variable in the sample. The higher the value of parameter δ, the more 
intense the increase in education for the less educated relative to the 
more educated.16 We impose the following restriction:
(15)
16. In particular, values of δ > 0 imply that in absolute terms the increase in years of education is 
biased toward the less-educated population. Negative values of δ result in a change biased toward the 
more-educated population.
figure 6. Convexity of returns to education and simulated 
change in earnings inequality
(Simulation 3)
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Equation (15) restricts the transformation to simulate an average 
increase of one year of education. When δ = 0, then θ = 1 and the 
change in educational structure matches Simulation 3. Figure 7 shows 
the underlying changes in years of education for dif ferent values of δ 
for Uruguay.17 A value of δ = 3 implies an extremely biased change 
toward the less educated, whereas δ = 1 and δ = 1/2 are still changes 
biased toward the less educated population. 
Table 6 reports the simulated changes in earnings inequality when the 
average years of education is increased by one year, assuming dif ferent 
values for δ. Additionally, in order to illustrate how significant is the 
change produced in the educational structure, for each value of δ we 
report the change in education inequality by means of the educational 
Gini and the educational gap between extreme earnings quintiles. 
The simulations suggest that in 12 of the 18 countries a value of 
δ > 1/2 is required to yield an educational expansion that lowers 
earnings inequality. In some cases, such as the Dominican Republic 
or El Salvador, a value of δ > 1 is required for this to happen. The 
requirement of δ > 1/2 is strong, taking into account that δ = 0 implies 
a uniform change. Therefore, our estimations suggest that even when 
17. The rest of the countries present figures very similar to this. 
figure 7. Changes in years of education using dif ferent values 
of δ, uruguay
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the educational expansion is assumed to be biased toward those less-
skilled, earnings inequality will rise if the increase in education is not 
progressive enough.
6. Including the ef fect of changes in the 
returns to education 
In the previous sections we assumed constant returns to education. 
The first-order impact results obtained with this assumption can be 
complemented with a more robust counterfactual that includes the 
ef fect of the shift in labor supply composition on returns. At this 
point, it is dif ficult to go further without imposing some theoretical 
structure on the data. Our setting closely follows the approach in 
Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and Lemieux (2001) and Manacorda, 
Manning, and Wadsworth (2012). 
We assume that firms produce using a typical neoclassical production 
function that combines labor and capital,
= α α−Y AK Lt t t t
1 (16)
Capital is assumed to be exogenous to the firms’ hiring decisions. Labor 
is a composite input that aggregates E dif ferent skills or education 
groups (indexed by e) using a CES technology18:
θ= ∑


ρ ρ
=L Lt e
E
et et1
1
(17)
where θ1t = 1 is a normalization for the relative ef ficiency parameters. 
We allow this parameter to change across periods to capture dif ferences 
in education quality of dif ferent cohorts or skill-biased technological 
change. Substitution between dif ferent education groups is measured 
by the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/(1 − ρ). For simplicity, we 
assume that dif ferent age/experience groups are perfect substitutes, 
18. Similarly to Manacorda, Sanchez-Paramo, and Schady (2010), we assume that there are more than 
two educational or skill levels but we do not nest multiple levels within the unskilled factor.
30 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 51 No. 1 (May, 2014), 1–39
although they can dif fer in ef ficiency/quality units.19 The main reason 
to keep this assumption is to avoid cross-ef fects between changes in 
education and returns to experience. Therefore, Let is composed of 
dif ferent experience or age groups indexed by a, that is
λ= ∑ =L Let a
A
ea eat1 (18)
The relative ef ficiency parameter λea is assumed to be time invariant 
and λe1 is normalized to one. Under the assumption of competitive 
markets and normalizing the price of output to one, log wages are 
given by:
logweat = logα + logYt + logθet + logλea − ρlogLt
    + (ρ − 1)logLet
(19)
Equation (19) cannot be directly estimated by OLS since, for instance, 
we need an estimation of ρ and θet in order to measure Lt. Nevertheless, 
consider the following specification based on (19) where dt denotes time 
fixed ef fects, (dt × de )denotes interactions between time and education 
dummies, and (dt × da ) denotes interactions between education and 
age dummies:
logweat = const + dt + (dt × de) + (de × da) + ∈eat (20)
The time fixed ef fects absorb logYt – ρlogLt, the time-education 
interactions absorb logθet + (ρ – 1)logLet and education-age interactions 
identify logλea.20 Consider also the wage gap relative to the lowest 
educational group:
θ λ ρ= + + −
w
w
L
L
log log log ( 1)logeat
at
et ea
et
t1 1
(21)
19. This could be extended in the same direction as Card and Lemieux (2001) to account for more 
interesting cohort ef fects. With a dif ferent approach, Sapelli (2007) performs an interesting analysis 
using synthetic cohorts, constructed from successive cross-section surveys, to study the evolution of 
income distribution in Chile. In particular, the author analyzes whether the pattern of cohort ef fects 
can be explained by trends in the mean and dispersion of years of education and returns to education 
within the cohort.
20. Identification of λea allows us to estimate Let from (18).
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Equation (21) cannot be implemented empirically without further 
assumptions because Let varies at the same level as the unobserved 
logθet. Instead of imposing a linear trend like Card and Lemieux (2001) 
we allow logθet to vary additively in e and t, i.e., θet = fe + ft where fe 
and ft are education and time dummy variables. Then, the estimable 
version of equation (21) is given by21:
ρ( )= + + × + − + ∈w
w
d d d d
L
L
log ( 1)logeat
at
e t e a
et
t
at
1 1
(22)
Changes in the educational composition of the population af fect returns 
to schooling according to the elasticities of substitution embedded in 
labor demand. Given the assumptions of the model, it is easy to see 
that the elasticity of log(weat/w1at)with respect to the relative labor 
supply Let/L1t is given by:
η
ρ
( )
=
−( 1)
log
eat w
w
eat
at1
(23)
If we focus on the Mincer equation specified on educational levels 
(where the estimated returns are interpreted as log-dif ferences with the 
lowest level), we can use (21) to simulate the percentage variation of 
the Mincerian coef ficients in response to the counterfactual educational 
changes.22 Since the elasticity is not constant over time, we use the 
baseline year elasticity in order to simulate the changes during the 
subsequent period. For example, we use ηeat = 1990 to simulate the changes 
in the Mincerian coef ficients of educational levels (e = 1,…,6) when 
the educational structure of the year 2009 is replicated in the baseline 
surveys of 1990.23 Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the estimated ρ, 
21. Identification of ρ relies on the exogenous variation of Let/L1t. Since labor participation decisions 
are endogenous to the wage level, this ratio can change in response to demand shocks. To overcome 
this drawback, we instrument the ratio with Net/N1t where Net is the size of the population at the cell 
(e,t) regardless of the activity status. The estimations use the hourly wage instead of total earnings, to 
hold to a closer proxy of worker productivity. Finally, we weight regressions by the number of workers 
in each cell (e,a,t) and cluster standard errors at the (e,a) cell level.
22. Note that from equation (21) it follows that (logweat − logw1at) does not depend on the supply of 
levels of education other than e and 1. This is because the CES technology implies that changes in Ljt 
with j ≠ e ≠ 1 proportionally af fect weat and w1at.
23. In order to calculate the percentage change in returns we need to use the structural parameters to 
estimate Let/L1t and its change.
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table 7. simulated inequality change after accounting  
for changes in returns to education
Country Period
no changes in returns Changes in returns
simulation 1 simulation 2 simulation 1 simulation 2
Argentina 1992-2009 0,2 *** 1,2 *** 0,0  1,0 ***
Brazil 1992-2009 1,0 *** 1,6 *** 0,0  0,3 ***
Chile 1990-2009 0,6 *** 0,7 *** -0,2 *** -0,2 ***
Costa Rica 1990-2009 0,9 *** 3,2 *** 0,8 *** 3,2 ***
Ecuador 1994-2009 0,4 *** 2,1 *** -0,6 *** 1,5 ***
El Salvador 1995-2008 2,5 *** 1,5 *** 1,5 *** 0,2 ***
Honduras 1995-2009 1,7 *** 1,0 *** 1,7 *** 0,9 ***
Mexico 1989-2008 0,6 *** 1,1 *** 0,4 *** 0,9 ***
Nicaragua 1993-2005 0,9 *** 1,3 *** 0,6 *** 1,1 ***
Panama 1991-2009 0,2 *** 2,0 *** 0,2 *** 2,0 ***
Peru 1997-2009 -0,0  1,7 *** -0,2 *** 1,4 ***
Uruguay 1992-2009 -0,9 *** 0,5 *** -0,9 *** 0,5 ***
Venezuela 1992-2006 0,6 *** 0,7 *** -0,7 *** -1,0 ***
Average 0,7 1,4 0,2 0,9
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from household surveys.
Note: Simulation 1 follows Gasparini et al. (2005) to change the educational structure, while Simulation 2 
follows Legovini et al. (2005). Returns to education are adjusted according to the elasticities estimated 
from the structural demand model. (*) Significance levels obtained using 200 bootstrap repetitions.
the average (across age groups) ηet and the average change in returns 
to each level of education relative to the incomplete primary level. 
The procedure described above allows simulation of the impact of 
an expansion in education measured in levels (as in Simulation 1 in 
Table 1). To implement the procedure when education is measured 
in years of schooling (as in Simulation 2 in Table 1), we proceed as 
follows: We generate counterfactual earnings using returns to levels of 
education adjusted by the changes predicted by the CES model and we 
keep other variables and residuals unchanged for each individual. Then, 
using these counterfactual earnings we re-estimate the quadratic-Mincer 
equation, and substitute the constant linear and quadratic coef ficients 
from this regression in the original Mincer equation. Figure A.1 in the 
appendix illustrates how the quadratic profile of returns to education 
is adjusted in this simulation for a subset of countries.
Table 7 reports the results of the microsimulations in Table 1 along with 
those obtained when taking into account changes in returns resulting 
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from the estimated elasticities, for the two simulations discussed 
above (years of schooling and educational levels). Table 7 suggests 
that, on average, the estimated impact of the education expansion 
remains unequalizing when allowing for changes in the returns to 
schooling, but it becomes smaller. For instance, under Simulation 2, 
while the mean increase in the Gini is 1.4 points when ignoring 
changes in returns to schooling, the estimated impact is reduced to 
0.9 points when including this ef fect. For all countries except Chile 
and Venezuela, inequality rises in response to the simulated changes 
in years of education, although less than in the partial equilibrium 
estimates.24 For Simulation 1 the mean impact is reduced from 0.7 
to 0.2 Gini points, but it is still positive (i.e., unequalizing). Under 
this simulation in some countries changes in returns compensate the 
initial unequalizing ef fect of education, keeping inequality unchanged 
(Argentina and Brazil), while for others the overall impact of the 
education expansion becomes equalizing (Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela). 
7. Concluding remarks 
We find that the direct ef fect of the increase in education experienced 
by Latin American countries in the last two decades was unequalizing, 
and that according to the projected scenarios, this result is expected 
to hold for future improvements in education if they are not strongly 
biased toward the less-educated population. Both facts are closely 
linked to the convexity of returns to education. With convex returns, 
even a progressive change in education may lead to a more unequal 
distribution of earnings and hence to a more unequal income distribution. 
This paper shows that this is not merely a theoretical possibility with 
little relevance in practice, but that it is a widespread phenomenon 
across Latin American economies. We also find that, on average, the 
estimated impact of the education expansion remains unequalizing 
when allowing for changes in returns to schooling, although the ef fect 
becomes smaller. 
24. There is a concern regarding the ability of the quadratic specification to accurately fit the coun-
terfactual earnings profile if returns to level of education change in a non-trivial way. For this reason 
we recalculated Simulation 2 using a third-order polynomial (not reported) but we found no significant 
dif ferences with results obtained under the quadratic specification. Indeed, the education ef fect is un-
equalizing for the same set of countries.
34 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 51 No. 1 (May, 2014), 1–39
Of course, showing that under certain circumstances an increase in 
education may be linked in the short run to a growth in income inequality 
does not lead to the conclusion that investment in education should 
be reduced, as an education expansion has many positive implications 
for growth, equality of opportunity, mobility, and poverty reduction, 
among others. Moreover, if improvements in schooling are progressive 
enough, earnings inequality will fall after an education expansion. 
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figure a1. simulated changes in returns to education
(Simulation 2)
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Source: Own calculations based on microdata from household surveys.
Note: Figure shows the simulated changes in returns to education measured by the linear and quadratic 
coef ficient of the Mincer equation. Simulated changes follow from re-estimating the Mincer equation 
with counterfactual earnings obtained after adjusting returns to levels of education according to CES 
model predictions. The counterfactual scenario t=0 follows from simulating the initial period educational 
structure on the population of the final period (including the coef ficient adjustment).

